“Why I decentralized Bolivia” by Sánchez de Lozada, Gonzalo & Faguet, Jean-Paul
  
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and Jean-Paul Faguet 








Sánchez de Lozada, Gonzalo and Faguet, Jean-Paul (2014) “Why I decentralized Bolivia”. 
Department of International Development, The London School of Economics and Political 
Science, London, UK. 
 
Originally available from the Department of International Development, The London School of 
Economics and Political Science. 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60632/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: February 2015 
 
© 2014 The Authors 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 




 “Why I Decentralized Bolivia”1 
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Why would any president, having spent a career achieving the pinnacle of power, willingly hand it 
over to others he cannot control? This is the black hole at the heart of the decentralization debate 
that has never been satisfyingly answered. We provide a response to this question by considering 
the radical case of Bolivia, through an extended interview with the man who decentralized it. 
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada was a principal actor in some of the most important events in 
Bolivia’s—and indeed Latin America’s—modern history. A highly improbable politician and 
statesman, he rose to prominence as the minister who designed the stabilization plan that defeated 
hyperinflation in a period of near-national collapse. He was elected president in 1993 and again in 
2002. His first term saw a burst of reforms that decentralized political power and resources to 
municipalities, capitalized the largest state enterprises, reformed education, created a new public 
pension system, reformed the executive branch of government, and reformed the constitution. His 
second term saw rising unrest that culminated in huge demonstrations, shocking violence, and 
Sánchez de Lozada’s resignation and exile to the USA, where he lives today. This chapter focuses 
on his formative experiences in government, how he came to believe in the necessity of reform, and 
how he carried his party and government in a startling push that decentralized Bolivia. 
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Participation; political feasibility; hyperinflation; Evo Morales 
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Why would any president, having spent a career achieving the pinnacle of power, willingly hand it 
over to others he cannot control?
 
This is the black hole at the heart of the decentralization debate 
that few address and none have satisfyingly answered (Faguet 2012). Strictly speaking, the urge to 
decentralize is irrational in those who must, by definition, do it. Are presidents motivated by 
normative arguments about state effectiveness? Is decentralization politically convenient? Can 
politicians be altruistic? Are there really philosopher kings? 
This chapter attempts to answer these questions for the case of Bolivia, one of the most radical 
and well-known of decentralization reforming countries. Our attempt takes the form of an extended 
interview between an academic researcher and the former President of Bolivia whose government 
designed and implemented reform. We begin with Bolivia’s long-term historical trajectory, which 
created its rich, complicated social and political tapestry, and then home in on the formative 
experiences and political transformation of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, the man who decentralized 
Bolivia. 
The arid altiplano highlands of western Bolivia have long been home to ancient civilizations. 
Prior to the Inca conquest of the fifteenth century, the most important of these was probably the 
Tiahuanaco culture, centered on a small town of the same name just south of Lake Titicaca. From 
about 100 AD onwards, Tiahuanaco developed a strong religious, artistic, and agro-economic 
presence whose influence spread throughout the entire southern altiplano (Klein 2003). Its 
distinctive pottery, religious artifacts, and important agricultural innovations, such as mountain 
terracing, complex irrigation, and the characteristic suka kollus (flooded-raised field) agriculture, 
which insulated crops from the cold and dramatically increased yields, spread far north and south to 
what are modern-day Peru, Chile, and Argentina. 
A marked fall in precipitation around 1000 AD, and possibly a severe drought, appear to have 
led to the collapse of Tiahuanaco. By the mid-fifteenth century, Incas entering the region from the 
north recorded only remnants of Tiahuanaco amongst the wealthy, warlike, Aymara-speaking 
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kingdoms of the altiplano. The Incas were a Quechua-speaking power centered on Cuzco (now 
Peru), who absorbed disparate peoples, cultures, and religions into a heterogeneous empire 
governed by a sophisticated administrative apparatus. They were an absolute monarchy and a vast 
empire, spanning most of South America’s Pacific coast. But civil war, the resentment of many of 
the conquered, and the devastating effects of European diseases weakened the empire to the point 
where, in 1532, fewer than two hundred Spaniards fighting with firearms, cannon, and a few dozen 
horses were able to defeat a vast empire and an army numbering in the tens of thousands. 
Spanish colonists came to Bolivia to exploit its enormous mineral wealth, and—in smaller 
numbers—to convert its indigenous peoples to Christianity. Many colonizers were rapacious, and 
the two-tiered society that grew out of conquest featured extreme levels of oppression, inequality, 
and exploitation. Spaniards and their descendants inhabited the towns and cities, and owned the 
mines and large landed estates. Indigenous peasants lived in villages and were forced to pay tribute 
and work the land and mines of their foreign overlords. This social and economic order was largely 
inherited by the republic after independence in 1825. It broadly endured for a further 125 years, 
with mining wealth becoming more and more concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. By 1950, 
Bolivia was a backward country mired in poverty, and presided over by a “typical racist state in 
which the non-Spanish-speaking indigenous peasantry was controlled by a small, Spanish-speaking 
white elite, [their power] based ultimately on violence more than consensus or any social pact” 
(Klein 1993). The persistence of extreme poverty and inequality is striking. Bolivia’s GDP per 
capita of only $119 in 1952 (Dunkerley 1984) was highly unevenly distributed; most Bolivians 
lived in poor agricultural communities, while a tiny proportion of mining and landowning families 
controlled vast wealth. Only 8 per cent of Bolivia’s population had finished secondary school, and 
only 31 per cent could read. Nearly one-third of all children died before their first birthday, and 
most who survived died well before 50 (Dunkerley 1984). 
The 1952–3 revolution set out to change all this. The middle-class revolutionaries of the 
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Movement, MNR) raided army 
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weapons stores, armed workers and peasants, and led a popular uprising against the oligarchical 
regime and its superestado minero (mining superstate). They won a crushing victory, and then 
mounted a concerted effort to reorganize the country’s economic and social relations. Their 
preferred instrument was a highly centralized, interventionist state. They destroyed the superestado 
minero by nationalizing the mines and other strategic sectors, and attacked the broader oligarchy by 
seizing its lands and redistributing them to the peasantry. Once the “commanding heights” of the 
economy were in its control, the MNR launched Bolivia on a state-led modernization strategy that 
used public corporations and regional governments to break down provincial fiefdoms, transform 
social relations, and create a modern, industrial, more egalitarian society. To this end the President 
directly named prefects, who in turn appointed entire regional governments and their various local 
dependencies, forming a cascading chain of authority that emanated from the capital. 
The many coups and political uprisings that intervened between 1953 and the arrival of 
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in Bolivia in 1991 did little to change this defining characteristic of 
centralized, top-down rule. When he arrived in August of that year, Bolivia had some 100 legally 
incorporated municipalities, of which maybe 30 existed in any operational sense. The rest had 
perhaps an honorary mayor who presided over the town’s annual festival and occasionally 
inaugurated a new school, but enjoyed no salary, budget, offices, or staff. Local decisions of any 
consequence were taken by central government in La Paz, or its representatives in one of Bolivia’s 
nine departmental capitals. The few officials who resided beyond the regional capitals were 
implementing agents with small budgets and little discretion. Even minor decisions concerning 
local schools and clinics were the responsibility of central education and health officers, to whom 
local residents appealed from a distance, if at all. 
Hence decentralization via the Law of Popular Participation (1994) was an unexpected shock 
that almost no one at first understood. The core of the law consisted of four points (Secretaría 
Nacional de Participación Popular, 1994): 
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1. Resource Allocation. Revenue sharing to municipalities6 doubled to 20 per cent of all 
national tax revenue. Crucially, allocation switched from unsystematic, highly political 
criteria to a strict per capita basis. 
2. Responsibility for Public Services. Ownership of local infrastructure in education, health, 
irrigation, roads, sports and culture, and water and sanitation was transferred to 
municipalities, along with the responsibility to maintain and extend these networks. Staffing 
and salary issues remained central responsibilities. 
3. Oversight Committees (OCs; Comités de Vigilancia) were established to oversee municipal 
activities. Composed of representatives from grass-roots groups, OCs propose projects and 
provide a parallel channel of representation in local policy-making. Their ability to have 
central transfers suspended gives them real power. 
4. Municipalization. 198 dormant municipalities (out of 311 in total) were reactivated, and the 
borders of existing municipalities were expanded to include suburbs and rural catchment 
areas. 
The change in local affairs produced by these measures was immense. Before reform, most 
Bolivians, and the vast majority of Bolivian territory, had no local government of any description, 
and the broader state was present—if at all—in the form of a health post, schoolhouse, or military 
garrison, each reporting to its respective ministry. After reform, elected local governments sprang 
up throughout the land. 
As Faguet (2012) has shown, the effects on public investment and public services were 
dramatic. Decentralization shifted public investment from infrastructure and economic production 
(e.g. hydrocarbons, transportation, energy) into primary social services and human capital 
accumulation (e.g. education, health, water and sanitation). Smaller, poorer, rural municipalities—
largely ignored since Bolivian independence —gained significant resources, producing a much 
more equitable distribution of resources across Bolivia’s territory. Lastly and most impressively, 
                                                 
6
 Strictly speaking, to “provincial municipal sections”, which are territorial subdivisions of provinces that unite various 
municipalities having geographical and historical ties, such as “counties” in the US  and “comarcas” in Spain. 
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decentralization made public investment much more responsive to objective local needs than it had 
been before, under centralized government. Whereas central government had invested more in 
education and health in wealthier cities where indicators of need were lower, local governments 
invested resources where they were needed more. Hence municipalities with lower literacy began to 
get more education investment, and those with worse access to sanitation received more investment 
in water and sewerage. This marked a reversal of central government’s previous practices, which 
was to concentrate investments in districts already better off. The largest beneficiaries were 
Bolivia’s smaller, poorer, more rural districts. The trends described are strong and hold across the 
universe of Bolivian municipalities.
7
 
Who is the man who pushed through these reforms? In many ways Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada 
is a highly improbable politician and statesman. The son of political exiles, he was educated in the 
United States, studying philosophy at the University of Chicago. To this day he speaks Spanish with 
an obvious American accent, which he deploys to comic effect. His acid wit won him friends and 
enemies in equal measure throughout his career. His rivals admit that he is an intelligent, creative 
politician, as bold as he is stubborn. He is also a highly successful entrepreneur who, with his 
brother, built up one of the country’s largest private mining companies and became one of Bolivia’s 
richest men. 
He came to prominence as the Minister of Planning and Coordination who mapped out 
Bolivia’s return from hyperinflation and the brink of economic disaster in 1985–6, with the help of 
Jeffrey Sachs, then of Harvard University. Sánchez de Lozada went on to head the MNR ticket in 
the 1989 election and won a plurality of the popular vote. But he was denied the presidency by an 
alliance of the second- and third-place finishers, General Hugo Banzer of the ADN (Acción 
Democrática Nacionalista, Nationalist Democratic Action), and Jaime Paz Zamora of the MIR 
                                                 
7
 Such trends hold across a broad range of countries as well. See Channa and Faguet (2012) for a survey of 
international effects on education and health; Faguet and Shami (2008) analyze decentralization’s effects 
on spatial inequality. 
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(Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria, Leftist Revolutionary Movement). This alliance of the 
left- and right-most of the major parties was made further improbable by the fact that Gen. Banzer’s 
dictatorship had persecuted and killed many MIR activists in the 1970s. “A river of blood divides 
the MIR from the ADN,” Paz Zamora had famously declared. But when Sánchez de Lozada won 
the election, the ex-dictator and the ex-Marxist found a way to work together, and Paz Zamora 
became president. 
Four years later Sánchez de Lozada ran again, won more votes, and this time his opponents 
could not stop him. In alliance with the populist UCS (Unión Cívica de Solidaridad, Civic 
Solidarity Union) and the intellectual left-wing MBL (Movimiento Bolivia Libre, Free Bolivia 
Movement), amongst others, he set about implementing his Plan de Todos (Plan for All), a 
strikingly ambitious set of reforms that had five major planks: privatization of state-owned 
enterprises via “capitalization” (i.e. sales proceeds were reinvested in 50/50 joint ventures with 
strategic private partners, as opposed to reverting to the general budget, as in most countries); 
decentralization via the Law of Popular Participation; education reform; pension fund reform; and 
reform of the executive branch and constitutional reform. In this way he hoped to increase 
economic investment, accelerate economic growth, deepen democracy, and make the state more 
effective and efficient. And the MNR hoped to reverse the steady inroads that the UCS and 
Condepa (Consciencia de Patria, Conscience of the Homeland), another populist party led by a 
popular television personality, were making into the MNR’s core vote. 
Sánchez de Lozada ended his term with strong economic growth and popular participation and 
executive/constitutional reform well under way, but capitalization only barely completed. He 
handed power over to Gen. Banzer, who had finally achieved the electoral victory he craved. After 
a period out of office as required by the constitution, Sánchez de Lozada ran and won again, but this 
time with a margin of less than two per cent over Evo Morales and Manfred Reyes Villa, who 
essentially tied for second place. With the vote continuing to splinter amongst more and more non-
traditional political parties, Sánchez de Lozada returned to the Presidency at the head of a large and 
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unwieldy coalition. Economic growth was poor and the fiscal deficit was large and growing. A 
cycle of popular protests abetted by Morales and his new political movement, the MAS 
(Movimiento al Socialismo, Movement to Socialism), whose principal support came from coca 
growers’ unions, gained force when it was alleged that the government planned to export Bolivian 
gas to the USA via a Chilean port. Protest turned into a popular blockade of La Paz. Sánchez de 
Lozada ordered the army and police to intervene to allow essential supplies to reach the capital, and 
59 civilians died in the ensuing violence. Amid much rancor and a fog of rumor and misinformation 
from all sides, Sánchez de Lozada resigned the Presidency and left the country. 
The period that followed was one of deep political uncertainty as the old political party system 
centered on the MNR, ADN, and MIR collapsed, and a new politics struggled to emerge. The old 
certainties of left vs. right and labor vs. capital were swept away in the upheaval. Political parties 
and movements espousing a huge array of causes, many of them remarkably local, sprouted in their 
hundreds across the land. Into this vacuum stepped Evo Morales with a discourse of ethnic 
grievance, vindication, and recovery, filling the void that Sánchez de Lozada’s resignation had left. 
Morales won the presidential election of 2005, and has since filled the Bolivian national stage to the 
exclusion of all else. The MAS now occupies the center of Bolivian politics, with other parties 
defining themselves against it and reacting to it, but none showing any ability thus far to make more 
than temporary inroads into its huge base of support. Whether the MAS, and the new Bolivian 
politics of identity, can outlive its dominant leader is for now impossible to tell. 
2 Interview 
2.1 The Experience of Government under Victor Paz Estenssoro 
Jean-Paul Faguet: The reforms your first administration introduced in the mid-1990s were 
breathtaking in their ambition. What made you think you could attempt so much? What 
made you think they would work? 
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Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada: I had had experience, thanks to the fact that I was Victor Paz 
Estenssoro’s quasi-Prime Minister. I had been Minister of Planning and Co-ordination in his 
last government, when we tamed inflation. Because of how government was organized, the 
Minister of Planning presided over CONEPLAN,
8
 which was the council where all the 
social and economic ministries sat, and where all kinds of important decisions were taken. 
We were all ministers, and we reviewed and agreed on policy matters. But I was the one 
who took these recommendations to the President and explained them to him. And then I 
took his decisions back down to CONEPLAN and explained again. Victor Paz very wisely 
held on to what is the essence of power: the ministries of foreign affairs, defense, homeland 
security, information, and other critical political ministries. He ran those directly. I didn’t 
have delegative authority there. But I did have a lot of power over the other areas of 
government, although he always had the last word. 
This was a very wise system. Take the stabilization plan. We rolled that out in three weeks, after 
discussing shock therapy vs. gradualism for one week, stabilization vs. indexing along Brazilian 
lines for another week, and a third week to write the Supreme Decree (executive order). It was 
intensely discussed at cabinet level, and it made important political actors buy into the ideas. 
JPF: Being in government with Dr Paz Estenssoro was clearly a very powerful experience 
for you, as I’m sure for everyone involved. Can you tell me a little more about that? 
GSL: One thing about Dr Paz is that he called in very young people compared to him. He 
was already in his 80s, and a very famous, revered national figure. 
Once I went to him—he had immense confidence in me after we stopped inflation, and I was a sort 
of a teacher’s pet—and I said “President, I know it’s not my business, but I’m worried because I 
understand that this commander of the army you appointed is very tied to Banzer. Aren’t you a little 
worried about this?” He replied, “Goni, I really respect you. But your advice is not welcome in this 
area. I’m running foreign affairs, homeland security, defense, information—all the political 
                                                 
8
 Consejo Nacional de Economía y Planificación [National Council for Planning and the Economy]. 
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ministries.” And the last thing he wanted was a meddling guy who had lots of power but not much 
political experience. In spite of the fact that I was part of the inner circle, Victor Paz understood very 
well where my place was. I was invited not to express any further opinions. “You are logical,” he 
said, “and I have a great deal of respect for your opinion. You may sway me, but I need to do this 
myself. I need to talk to the ministers that have line responsibility and make these decisions.” 
The economy and social affairs were a different story. I always defended the introduction of 
market economics to the MNR and the country as something that should have been done in 
the revolution, because we were not communists. From the start, we should have gone to a 
market economy and not a command economy. When we were pushing through the 
stabilization plan, we called it the New Economic Policy (NEP), just like the early 
Bolsheviks, because ours was a populist party and they would accept that. They liked the 
sound of that. An important component was the Emergency Social Fund, which was based 
on an idea of Victor Paz. He understood the need for it, as a cushion for the economic shock 
that was coming. I was very happy because I thought a market economy had to be regulated 
to be stable, because you know I never believed in free markets. It’s like sports—imagine 
football without rules, without impartial referees. In markets, the minute you don’t have 
rules and an appeals process, you don’t have a market. A market is about competition. To 
compete, you need rules and umpires, otherwise it becomes monopolies. I believe in markets 
like the Chinese believe in markets—the cat’s only good if it catches mice. 
2.2 A “Stolen” Election and Goni’s Political Transformation 
JPF: How did you go from there to your first Presidential election? 
GSL: I was conscious of the fact that I’d played a key role in stopping hyperinflation and 
achieving economic stability. Victor Paz was impeded by the constitution, and also by his 
age, from running again. And to everyone’s surprise, including my own, I became the most 
viable candidate my party had. For electoral reasons, the number 2 man in the party started 
“Why I Decentralized Bolivia”  Sánchez de Lozada & Faguet 
 
 10 
attacking the economic model that had permitted us to re-achieve growth and stop 
hyperinflation. I obviously realized it was a politician trying to win votes, but I was 
identified with the stabilization program so I started to defend it. And then I joined the 
primaries and lost them all, except for Cochabamba, the department I represented in 
Congress. I didn’t really have political ambition then. I felt that my background—having 
been brought up in the USA, my accented Spanish, and being a successful mining 
entrepreneur—made me politically unviable. So I got into the elections for the best of 
reasons—to defend what we’d achieved. Being a modern man, I brought in modern 
technologies, like advertising and polling, and won the election by 1 per cent. The second 
round is decided in Congress between the top three candidates. And these two guys, Banzer 
to the right and Jaime Paz to the left, hated me because I’d come up through the middle and 
had very sharp elbows. I was able to unite Congress, but unfortunately against me! They 
didn’t have the congressional representation to elect one or the other between them, so they 
played around with the electoral courts, and they were able to take away our majority in the 
Senate. Through very unfortunate interpretations of the law, and also through corruption, 
they were able to eliminate representatives in the Chamber of Deputies of smaller left and 
center parties. So these two parties who hated each other got together and formed a 
government and froze me out. 
I wasn’t aided by my sense of humor. I said, “You know, if Jaime Paz had known Banzer was 
persecuting him all those years in order to give him the presidency, he wouldn’t have run so fast!” 
That didn’t make me very popular with them. 
But when I realized that there was a general acceptance that I’d been cheated, that the rules 
of the game had been violated, I set about using Jaime Paz’s four years of government to get 
an impartial electoral court. “How can you play football if the umpires can be paid off?” I 
would say. I made adverts, gave speeches, and made the intellectual case. It weighed heavily 
on my mind. They could see it was going to be very difficult to get me next time, because 
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you can play around with the electoral process if the difference is marginal—like the USA, 
where the presidency was decided by a political vote in the Supreme Court—but not if the 
difference is large. I had a lot of moral authority as people knew I had been cheated. So 
instead of attacking the government, I kept saying, “Let’s get an impartial electoral court.” I 
realized that if I was going to run again, I needed a level playing field. 
I also needed to overcome the fact that I was seen as foreign, upper-class, and distant. The 
polling and focus groups showed that I was respected in the sense of competence, but people 
couldn’t relate to me. So I decided to do something that ended up being very smart. I got in 
a car with a driver and visited almost every town in Bolivia. I said “Goni’s listening.” 
Instead of giving speeches, I would listen. I would bring people together and they would tell 
me their problems, and I would say to them something that I believe. I said, “You know, my 
wife and I are parents, and we’ve lived life, and have experienced the things our children do, 
the mistakes they’re making. We know what they’re doing, their mistakes, and at the same 
time we’re intelligent enough and love them enough to know that the only solutions are the 
ones they find themselves, because they’re the ones who have the problems. We’re a 
generation away, and though we may be blessed by experience, wisdom, and affection, all 
you can do is support them because you really can’t solve their problems. That’s the basis of 
good family relations.” So I went out and said, “I’ve come to hear your problems and hear 
your solutions, because the people who know the solutions are the people who have the 
problems, not the people who don’t have the problems.” There’s a famous French saying, 
“Nothing is more bearable than other people’s problems.” What I had decided to do was 
listen to other people’s problems. 
This was extremely effective because if you listen and don’t talk, people think you’re 
intelligent. And they think you care about them. And that was my political problem. I had a 
very clear diagnosis of how people saw me—they saw me as honest, they saw me as 
capable, but they saw me as very distant from their lives and their problems. This was an 
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eye-opener. I would say, “I want to know about your problems.” The motto was “Goni 
escucha.”9 As you know, Victor Paz was always known as El doctor Victor Paz Estenssoro. 
Given all these difficulties, if I went out there as Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada y Sánchez de 
Bustamante (my mother’s name), I wasn’t going to get very far. It would just confirm the 
image: totally upper class, totally distant from their lives, totally uncaring. So my associates 
and I took the wise decision to be “Goni” (my childhood nickname in the USA, where no 
one could pronounce “Gonzalo”). The motto was “Goni escucha.” 
The problem was that if I wanted to be president I had to win by a landslide. Nobody really 
wanted me. The right hated me—they considered me a radical leftist—and the left 
considered me a neoliberal heartless capitalist. So if I wanted to be able to win an election I 
had to be closer to regular people. I didn’t realize it at first, but I learned two big lessons in 
this process. One, that what’s important to people vis-á-vis the state is solutions to the 
problems that affect their lives on a daily basis—basically, education, health, and 
community development like sports and culture. I was very influenced by a woman who 
said to me: “You know, Goni, our problems are so great that nobody can solve them. But at 
least you’ve come to listen to what our problems are, although we know you can’t solve 
them. And also we really appreciate that you’re not promising anything. You’re just 
listening.” I realized that people are very conscious of what their problems are and they’re 
convinced that their problems probably have no solution. But what they really resent is 
politicians who arrive at election time to make outrageous promises that they know they 
can’t fulfill. So I ended up looking intelligent, sensitive, and modest, which is, of course, 
very desirable. 
Secondly, I started learning about what people really want. I was the guy who had slain 
inflation, but I still didn’t understand that. They know that the only solutions to poverty are 
two things—health and education. That’s the only kind of income redistribution that they 
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really believe in. They get suspicious if you promise anything else. They know those are 
key, and they tell you, “We’re never going to get out of this poverty if we don’t have health 
and education.” And I also realized that the things that really affect peoples’ lives are the 
things they can achieve through consensus,, and that was the secret of stable democracies 
like the American, with its town hall traditions, the Scandinavian and some other European 
democracies. 
By going out into the countryside and the neighborhoods and listening to their problems, I 
had a sort of conversion. By talking to these people and really listening, which in the 
beginning was done to improve my image, I started to learn from them. I went down and 
listened and found that they were 100 per cent right. It was very successful from a political 
point of view. But also, I became a believer not only in decentralization, but in a deeper 
social dimension, which was popular participation. That’s a very nice phrase, but it reflected 
something different and deeper. People talk about decentralization like corporate entities 
delegating power and resources. I became a real believer in something that was intrinsic to 
the experience of the town hall meeting—of people discussing their problems and coming 
up with solutions. When people talk about decentralization they usually think of handing off 
responsibility but not authority. We wanted to hand down authority. 
But if we did this, we’d be left with lots of poor municipalities. People’s local problems 
might be solved, but what about the other great problem of today: the cost of government? 
Because the other big issue is that there’s no way you can afford all the levels of 
government. If you have a central government, and then you have a state government, and 
then you have a county government, and then you have a municipal government, then you’re 
dead. 
JPF: Because it’s too expensive? 
GSL: Too expensive! You can’t support it all. So what people want from government is 
what’s really important to them. But if you try to run it all from the center the resources will 
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never make it down, and you can’t afford to run all the levels of government and all the 
services. But then I realized that could be solved too—hence “popular participation.” Much 
of what was needed could be done on a volunteer basis. The tradition that the Spanish took 
up from the Inca empire is that people provided labor free as an obligation to the 
community, a bit like military conscription. You either went and worked, for example, on 
the roads for a number of days, or you paid a tax and were freed of the responsibility. 
Usually the upper class paid the tax and the lower classes did the work. Since local 
government, especially rural local government, was so underfinanced, everything was made 
for the upper and middle classes. That’s the absurd thing about public subsidies—they 
usually don’t benefit the people who need them. 
So in Bolivia the big cities had better services and poor villages had almost nothing. But we could 
revive and transform that tradition through popular participation, with citizens contributing to their 
own services, especially in rural areas where they’re much more willing to volunteer. Secondly, 
people had to be able to hold politicians responsible. And that’s where my idea for decentralization 
started. Both things were possible with popular participation. Without it, neither is. 
So the experience of that campaign ended up being crucial, because I realized two things: 
(1) only the people who have the problems have the solutions, and (2) an idiot close to a 
problem is better than a genius a thousand miles away. Whoever’s feeling the pain will 
know the solution better than anyone. So I went into this radical effort to decentralize power 
in Bolivia. 
2.3 “Why I Decentralized Bolivia” 
JPF: That’s very compelling and idealistic and high-minded. And also … with the greatest 
respect … not entirely credible. At least not on its own. Are Presidents really motivated by 
philosophy? 
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GSL: I had to stop this fight for a federalist system which came from the regions. I realized 
that the “regions” are really local elites who wanted to capture rents from our natural 
resource wealth, and managed to mobilize broader movements behind them. I kept saying to 
them: “What you guys really want is not to have to come to La Paz to steal. You want to be 
able to steal at home, so you want to have a devolution of resources, you want power 
without responsibility.” I was totally against these groups of rent-seekers. 
JPF: These were the people pushing for decentralization then [before 1994]? 
GSL: Yes! Landowners in Santa Cruz, growing soya, cotton, corn—people who had 
benefitted enormously from national policies and investments. For example, roads built all 
over the eastern lowlands. When Victor Paz nationalized the mines he fixed the exchange 
rate, which decapitalized the mines. They tried hard to diversify the economy, because 
Bolivia was dependent on imported food. And almost all of the capital they invested went to 
Santa Cruz and the other lowlands departments. From being a very backward place, Santa 
Cruz progressed rapidly, and became powerful and wealthy. And these people became 
unruly. They seemed to think they deserved it, or they had achieved it by themselves. 
JPF: Was it a political project? I remember when I arrived in Bolivia in 1991, it would 
occasionally appear in the newspaper that certain organizations—the Comité Pro-Santa 
Cruz, for example—were agitating in favor of decentralization. And as you say, it was 
always regional decentralization. Was it just the elites, or did this have any sort of popular 
echo? 
GSL: It had an echo because everybody identifies with the region they’re born in. Especially 
in a country that’s ethnically and geographically divided into isolated areas: the altiplano 
speaks Aymara, the valleys speak Quechua, and the lowlands speak Guaraní. They’re very 
different—their religion and beliefs, culture, folk music. Those identities are strong in 
Bolivia. So here was a country with a strong tendency towards federalism—granting it 
would have led to a continual struggle for the rents that raw materials produce. 
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I really believed that unless there’s a deep reason for federalism—like in the United States with all 
the states big and small, which were basically founded for reasons of religious liberty—it was 
unnecessary. When you really study it, what the US has is a religious geography: Puritans, Quakers, 
Baptists, Mormons. The basis of the Union was a desire for religious liberty independent of the state. 
That’s why they didn’t want to be in a system where the greater populations of states like New York, 
Massachusetts, or Pennsylvania could dominate the rest. And that’s why everybody pushed for this 
crazy idea of Washington, DC, which is not in any state. Because, you know, the capital of the 
United States should have been Philadelphia. 
Bolivia’s characteristics were different. There the main divides are geographic and ethnic, 
and that makes Bolivia very heterogeneous. I was very worried by this. Bolivia was 
historically dominated by where the wealth came from. The capital was Sucre. Why? 
Because it was close to the silver mines [of Potosí]. Then we had a civil war at the turn of 
the century, and the government was taken to La Paz, the center of production of non-
ferrous minerals. But, in one of those compromise solutions, the capital stayed officially in 
Sucre, where the judicial branch [i.e. the Supreme Court] physically remained, but the 
executive and legislative branches were sent to La Paz. And if I had been a better politician 
and a lesser statesman, what I would have done is move the government to Santa Cruz, 
where it had to be because of the gas, oil, soya, iron ore, and everything else. That would 
have been another step in a logical progression. But I was very worried because there was an 
immense amount of pressure, especially from the most favored departments. There were 
even threats of secession as they demanded a bigger and bigger piece of the pie, even though 
they were highly privileged by public investment. 
As a solution to this political problem I decided that you had to go to the roots, you had to 
create local government. You could only have a unitarian state if it was decentralized, 
because Bolivia—like so many countries—was a tree without roots. The state wasn’t being 
nourished; no nutrients were going up. I realized we could decentralize the things that really 
matter about government to people—health, education, local development, agriculture, 
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county roads, sports. And it became very clear to me that instead of fighting and trying to 
repress these regional movements that were so powerful, there was another solution. 
That solution allowed me to undermine the elites. I was able to pull the rug out from under 
this movement by not going to the regions, but instead going down beneath them. I pulled 
the rug out from under these dominant elites and their attempts to control public funds. 
I was very interested to find that in municipal elections, only half the population could vote. 
The towns were like the medieval, walled towns  where the people, the vecinos,  lived who 
owned the land, which the Indians, the campesinos, worked. Indians couldn’t vote, so 
municipal elections were held amongst townspeople only. We got a group of people 
together—sociologists, economists, agricultural experts, historians and politicians. and we 
found that in the colony, what was called the cantón was basically the Indian community, 
and the provincias were provinces, a concept inherited from France. After spending more 
than 300 hours in meetings, and many drafts of the law, we found that the provincial 
municipal sections had fallen into disuse, and we decided to revive them as a basis for the 
Law of Popular Participation. 
To sum it up, why did I do it? I did it because of the dangerous struggle between the regions 
and the central government, which was ironically most vigorous in those areas which the 
central government had most helped to develop. 
JPF: So you were really worried about centrifugal forces that might break the country up . . . 
GSL: I was; I had seen it in Victor Paz’s government. Elites were continuously fighting land 
taxes; people agitating on behalf of regional universities’ budgets; the regional Comités—all 
of that was a leftover from the military regimes. They were really regional de facto 
governments that just wanted more public resources. It got so bad that these regional 
interests would decide where the state oil company should drill its wells. It was just a mess. 
Many of these reforms—not just decentralization but also education and others—were born 
out of the fact that I had to beat this force that was going to destroy the country. These 
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privileged persons are the worst. The people who are the best off fight the hardest. You 
never have a problem when you raise taxes on the poor. You have terrible problems when 
you raise them on the rich, because they control the newspapers, and they go out screaming 
and yelling that jobs will be lost. So my problem was that I was fighting this regional battle 
which is a battle that cannot be won. 
JPF: Was that the basic reason why you decided to carry out popular participation? 
GSL: No. 
JPF: That, plus the visits to people who knew their own solutions . . . 
GSL: Those were the two intrinsic reasons. I became an advocate—I was converted. And 
then a third reason: I realized that strong democracies are decentralized because by 
decentralizing, you push the problems that are really important to people down to their level, 
where they can do something about them, if you’re willing to give them the resources. If you 
keep power centralized, you suffer the risk that the discontents and frustrations of their daily 
lives put the stability of the state in jeopardy. 
I wanted to build roots for Bolivian democracy. I saw that you could use OTBs [Organizaciones 
Territoriales de Base, local Grass Roots Organizations]—which are basically Indian communities or 
neighborhood associations, and which are intrinsic to Bolivian society—as building blocks. They 
would become the Comités de Vigilancia [Oversight Committees], which would have control over 
the budgeting process and the execution of investment. It would be based on local groups, which 
would have different natures in different parts of the country. And then you would graft onto it the 
European system—decentralized municipal government. Of course the minute you did that, you took 
all the steam out of the regional elites. 
So my decision to decentralize was intellectual. And it was political. And finally it was 
highly personal. I really believed then and believe now that you can’t have a tree that 
doesn’t have roots. 
JPF: So that’s why you decentralized. 
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GSL: Yes. But not only that. It was because I’d won in a landslide. 
JPF: Aha! This is the black hole question. You won and you won big, and you finally held 
national power in your hands. And you turned around and gave it away? Are you kidding? 
GSL: That’s the only time you can give it up! 
JPF: When you have it. Yes. The self-interested actor of political science might see that this 
is the right thing to do, might see that you have an opportunity because you’ve won with a 
big electoral majority, but would nonetheless not do it because as between having power or 
giving it away, you prefer to have it. After all, what were you fighting for in all those 
elections? 
GSL: The big point is this. Why was I attacked by the right and left and so weakened in my 
second government? Because when they saw the reforms I’d pushed through, including 
Popular Participation, they realized that my party would govern Bolivia for a very long time. 
2.4 Political Equality 
GSL: Let’s go to the next stage which I think is very important—the big discussion of how 
to distribute rents. I learned something. There are societies like the Japanese and maybe the 
Chinese where the culture promotes sacrifice in favor of others. Compare that to my own 
childhood. My father was a professor in political exile, and we were living on a very tight 
budget. Back then you ate what was in season. So when it was cherry season, you were 
lucky and you got cherries. And I learned that you cannot convince children that your 
brother needs more or your sister deserves more because they’d done something good or 
were growing or whatever. No. The kids would count all the cherries and we wouldn’t 
forgive anyone who got one more. So I became convinced that on a human level people 
intrinsically like democracy because of equality. 
Now, I had some very sophisticated people telling me we had to have a poverty index to give more 
money to poorer areas and less to the rich . . . all this bullshit. Intelligent bullshit. So finally we came 
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up with two solutions. The definition of the unit of government was a mixture of rural communities 
and urban municipalities, because Bolivian municipalities were basically medieval structures from 
feudal times. Many more recently have included suburbs. But to decentralize to them, you had to 
expand and make flexible the definition of municipalities to include surrounding rural areas. And we 
realized that the only way this can be tolerated is if resources are divided per person. No formulas, 
no poverty indices, just the same amount of money for everyone everywhere. 
But there’s more. First you transfer responsibilities. Then you transfer funds, and you know 
in advance that the funds you’re giving them are much smaller than the responsibility 
they’re taking on. The only way they can make it work is if the community volunteers a lot. 
Let’s say retired people, older people, groups that volunteer to work for the community. And 
the only way you can make that work for services they need is if they’re working for 
themselves, and seeing the benefit of it. So all of these things came together: (1) We had to 
get away from what would have been hell for my government, which was fighting with the 
regions; (2) it enabled me to be a statesman; and (3) I had a deep personal commitment 
related to my own family experience and to what I’d learned travelling around Bolivia. And, 
finally, it had to be simple—and we had to actually do it. 
JPF: The per capita criterion was bold and powerful in its simplicity. I’ve studied 
decentralization in many countries, and Bolivia stands out for having this simple 
mechanism, and for its profound effects on making decentralization work. Many times in 
my research I saw groups of campesinos demanding a school or clinic for their community. 
They’d accost the mayor and say, “We know there are 50 families living in our village.  
That’s 250 or 300 people.  That adds up to Bs. XX,000.  So where’s our school?” 
GSL: Of course! If we’d put a formula in there, the mayors would’ve told the peasants, 
“Sorry, the formula says you don’t get a school this year.” And the peasants would have 
turned around and gone home. Or actually they wouldn’t have travelled to see the mayor in 
the first place. Because it was always like that; the peasants were always getting cheated for 
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some reason they couldn’t understand. This reform they could understand. And once they 
understood it, they made it work for them. 
We did something else they’ll never pardon me for. We reformed education to teach in local 
people’s languages. We said to them, “You don’t want to speak only Quechua and Aymara.  You 
want to speak Spanish.  But the only way you can do that properly”—this was the most important 
part—“is to learn reading, writing, and arithmetic in your mother tongue. Once you’ve learned that, 
you can go to Sanskrit, Mandarin, English—it will open doors for you.  But you can’t start learning 
in Spanish if you don’t speak Spanish.  You have to start learning in your tongue, and then you can 
learn Spanish.” And I would say to them, “If you’re not careful, your children will start speaking like 
me!” And this started getting to them, that you have to respect your culture. 
But the teachers who spoke Aymara, Quechua, and Guaraní didn’t want it because they had 
struggled to become superior to the people they were teaching. They could speak those 
languages, but felt it was denigrating to do so. This refusal to do something they obviously 
could do made them “superior” to the campesinos, and made the campesino schoolchildren 
dumber. So bilingual education in indigenous languages was a major equalizing reform in 
both senses. 
But equality isn’t the only thing, and in Bolivia it gets taken too far. Education is a good 
example. It was my grandfather who first introduced the concept of university autonomy in 
Bolivia, which means no political interference in public higher education. So it was funny to 
go to universities and be told that I was against their autonomy. I would tell students, “You 
know, I’ve got bad news for you. You’re here because you don’t know and you hope that 
the people who are teaching you do know. How can you be equal? You’re not equal. We in 
democracy are equal.” The people would say “Why are we all equal? Why are you the same 
as I am?” They would look at me and go “We’re not the same, we’re poor. Why are you the 
same?” And I would say, “Because we’re all gonna die. That’s the basis of equality, that’s 
why your vote is as good as my vote. That is the primary reason of God-given equality.” 
And people would say, “Yes, you’re right.” That’s why a beggar or poor man has one vote 
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and we have one vote. And the rich or genius or visionary or saint has one vote—because 
we’re all gonna die. That’s the basis of the equality of man. That’s the basis of democracy. 
But at a lower level, you can’t have full equality everywhere because in education there’s an 
inherent inequality. A student doesn’t know, otherwise why is he there? 
So I believe in equality, fraternity, and liberty. And the most important of the three is 
equality. When we talk about popular participation, we mean radical decentralization with 
grass-roots participation. That’s why we have Oversight Committees, which are grass-roots, 
volunteer committees that participate picking projects and controlling expenses. It’s based 
on this notion of equality. 
2.5 Bolivia’s Historical Context 
JPF: These are powerful ideas. Where do they fit in Bolivia’s broader history? 
GSL: Look at the leaders Bolivia has had in the past and think of the economic booms and 
busts. We are condemned because of our incredible natural wealth. The interesting thing is 
that historically you see swings between presidentes bárbaros y presidentes letrados 
(barbarian vs. educated presidents). The history of Bolivia has been a generational swing 
between very educated, clear–thinking, and honest statesmen like Victor Paz and—in spite 
of my failures— I’d like to think myself, vs. Gen. Montenegro, Gen. Melgarejo, Evo 
Morales, and other bárbaros. That’s been the swing, and it’s usually around very powerful 
booms in raw material prices. 
Ask yourself: Why did Chile take over Bolivia’s sea coast in the 19th century? The one thing Chile 
didn’t need is more coast. Why did they do it? That little piece of land has been 40 per cent of 
Chile’s GNP for 120 years because that’s where all the copper and nitrate and guano are. And we 
can go further. There are two countries in Latin America that are only half their original size. One is 
Bolivia and the other is Mexico. We lost big blocks of land and it’s always around raw materials. We 
had a war with Brazil, who set up La República del Acre because when the rubber boom came [in 
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the nineteenth century], the most valuable area belonged to Bolivia. And they learned from the 
Americans and set up a republic which they later absorbed. We had to go all the way down to the 
jungle and have a war; we were able to stop it, but we lost a lot. They signed a treaty that they would 
compensate for lost territory by building railroads, which they never did. So you have two countries 
that are twice their original size: Brazil and the United States. And two countries that are half their 
original size: Mexico and Bolivia. And in all of these wars with our neighbors, our problem has 
always been the immense wealth we had, which they wanted. 
All of this was mirrored inside the country, too, when powerful regional elites tried and 
often succeeded in monopolizing some resource and holding the country to ransom. For 
most of Bolivia’s history from colonial times, our natural wealth has been a source of 
autocracy, dictatorship, and tremendous inequality. The first people who tried to break with 
that were Victor Paz Estenssoro and the MNR revolutionaries of 1952, who nationalized the 
mines and redistributed the land. 
My father was a member of the MNR and always admired the pre-Columbian community 
system, the ayllus, which were territorial areas made up of 48 agrarian communities, 24 
called upper communities and 24 called lower communities.  Marriage was only permitted 
between members of upper communities with members of the lower communities or vice 
versa to avoid inbreeding.  Interestingly enough, the areas occupied by the ayllus were 
basically the provincial municipal sections.  During the republican period, many of the 
communities became haciendas, where peasant farmers would work 3 days for the land 
owner, 3 days on their own plots, and one day, Sunday, for the Church.  My father rather 
romantically wanted the land reform done in such a way that peasants would become owners 
of their original plots of land, and then work the hacienda lands collectively as a 
community.  The MNR preferred to divide the land and give it to peasants, and leave in 
place the Napoleonic Code that permitted inheritance amongst offspring.  This resulted in 
the creation of minifundios (small landholdings), and as the transfer and sale of land was 
prohibited, productivity in the highlands and valleys plummeted. An interesting experience 
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is the story of the Nanny who brought up my two children.  Her family did not divide the 
land through inheritance; they get together during the winter among all the descendants of 
legal age to decide through lottery who worked their land the following year.  It’s interesting 
to note that the Spanish system of mayorazgo, meaning inheritance by the oldest male of the 
landholdings with the obligation to compensate other heirs, was abolished at the beginning 
of the 19th century, and hacienda holdings subdivided, which weakened landholdings even 
before land reform. 
Because of their material dialectic formation, the MNR also believed that the Revolución 
Nacional required the fusion of the two races, Indians and whites, into the New Bolivian 
Man. Along those lines, in my first term in office I was accompanied by Victor Hugo 
Cárdenas, an indigenous intellectual who was not a member of the party but had his own 
indigenous party, as the country’s first indigenous Vice President. I introduced the concept 
of Unity in Diversity, which Evo Morales is now doing all he can to break down, leaving a 
racist fight between white people and brown people. 
2.6 Was Decentralization a World Bank Imposition? 
JPF: Let’s come back to decentralization. Many decry it as an imposition of the World Bank 
and other aid agencies on developing countries. As an academic, I’ve often heard claims, 
and occasionally even reviewed papers asserting, that decentralization was imposed on 
Bolivia by the Bank. But I was working for the World Bank at the time, and this doesn’t 
seem right to me. 
GSL: Oh, they didn’t have the slightest idea! 
JPF: I remember my colleagues in the La Paz office asking, “What is this?” None of us 
knew. Colleagues from Washington called wanting to know what was going on. I was the 
officer in charge of health, education, and rural development. If I didn’t know, then neither 
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did anyone else. “So they want to legislate participation?,” we mocked, unfunnily. 
Eventually, I went and read the law, and that’s how we all found out. 
GSL: But it took you a while. You guys were clueless. 
2.7 Design of the Law of Popular Participation 
JPF: When you were campaigning for the presidency in the early 1990s, what did you 
diagnose as Bolivia’s major challenges? 
GSL: Well, the country was economically stable. Jaime Paz’s government hadn’t dismantled 
the stabilization. The country still had many structural problems that had to be attended to. 
In his last term, Victor Paz had said, “Look, I dismantled all I did in the Revolution. I’ll stop 
at privatization.  When you become President, you can do that if you want.” Jaime Paz was 
too scared, so that sort of thing was left to us. And we did it. We had to make an electoral 
offer, so we came up with a comprehensive plan, which was called the Plan de Todos, 
which was our governing agenda. The name was great. And it was serious. A lot of the 
things we ended up doing were in that plan. We worked with a good team of people, and it 
was an important step in re-imagining what the new Bolivia should be. 
JPF: When you became President and you had this idea of popular participation—who was 
in favor and who was against it then? 
GSL: Our governing coalition included a populist, Max Fernandez [leader of the UCS]. Max 
owned Bolivia’s most important brewery, and his only real interest was to make sure we 
didn’t increase sin taxes, which are a very good source of revenue. He supported us, but 
basically because he didn’t want us to become too energetic in collecting taxes by changing 
inspectors all the time. Then we had to give it a progressive tinge. We had the MBL 
[Movimiento Bolivia Libre], a sort of radicalized Christian Democrat bunch led by Antonio 
Araníbar, who had broken with Jaime Paz because they considered him corrupt and willing 
to do deals with ex-dictator Hugo Banzer and the ADN. We called people in from those two 
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parties, and of course from our party. We set up a multidisciplinary group of people who 
were interested in this concept of progressive social and income policies. These were very 
much intellectual, left-wing people. But it was awkward because the MBL supported the 
reforms and helped write the laws, but then voted against them in Congress! 
We realized it was extremely important that people in the coalition be part of this. We had people 
from Santa Cruz who were important regional figures, but also willing to break with the quasi-feudal 
organizations that defended elite interests there. You have to understand that during twenty years of 
military rule there hadn’t been any sort of democratic participation. In that context, self-appointed 
groups of landowners, businessmen, even workers grew up and prospered. They weren’t elected by 
anybody, and had a lot of power. They were “civic organizations” of a kind favored by the fascists. 
Opposing them was popular. 
JPF: In terms of interest groups within the economy, or within society, were there organized 
interests groups pushing for it? Or was this a discussion amongst a small group of 
technocrats? 
GSL: A small group of people, thirty or forty in total I guess. The relevant interest groups 
were pro-regional elites, and they were all going to be against it. Our response was, first of 
all, to make sure there was a lot of participation by high quality people from the parties in 
the coalition. And then by a lot of people who were lawyers, sociologists, technical finance 
experts, etc., looking at popular participation in a holistic way. We had to make sure that it 
wasn’t just my project or the group’s project. It had influential people from every party, and 
from wings of every party, who would guarantee us breadth of support. But it was 
selective—we looked for people who were interested and sensitive to this. This was not a 
cake that had already been baked. We really went for this inclusive process of working out 
the idea. In its design, too, it was a Plan de Todos. 
JPF: What did you rationally expect popular participation would achieve? 
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GSL: We knew what we wanted. We wanted local governments that could be held 
accountable for their actions, and not just demand money from the central government. We 
wanted to make it something that the people owned—that’s why it was so important. We 
had a concept of participative government where people who participated and accepted 
responsibility took over. We had a general idea, but of course the devil’s in the detail and 
that’s what we had to work on. But we also had a good name: Popular Participation—people 
being involved. It was a kind of unity of the pre-Columbian village institutions that had been 
overlaid by European and French Revolution ideas like the prefectures and departments. 
We knew we had something but we didn’t know quite what it was—that had to be worked out. I 
think we went through close to a hundred different versions of the law. There was a great deal of 
platonic dialogue. We would talk about it and explore different ideas, and at the end I would kick it 
to pieces and we’d go back to zero. We would go on for hours. It didn’t take very long for me to 
learn that meetings shouldn’t go on for more than three hours because you just don’t maintain any 
focus. We were running long meetings with hundreds and hundreds of hours. And just when we 
thought we’d made a breakthrough, I would start discussing it and—like a good platonic dialogue—
you end up kicking it to pieces again. 
It was an extremely progressive experiment of reform. It was anti-feudal, because it went 
against all those interests groups. The country was very feudalized—you had the COB 
[Central Obrera Boliviana—the national workers’ union], the Comités Cívicos, and others. 
They elected themselves and were never accountable to anyone else, like many NGOs are. 
They had great influence nationwide. We wanted to change that. 
That was a great time. We were trying really hard to do something good, to think things 
through carefully. All things considered, it was a very honest and idealistic type of 
government, my first government. 
JPF: Did you think it was necessary to keep discussion of the various versions of the law 
away from the public eye? 
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GSL: No. The real issue is that for a long time we didn’t really have anything to put forward. 
We needed something concrete before opening it up to a broader discussion. I felt that you 
had to have a clear proposal, and that proposal first had to be intensely discussed—intensely 
criticized and argued against. I remember many times I found to my surprise that some of 
the criticisms that seemed worst or least fair turned out to be right. Somebody would walk 
into the room and say, “I’m a historian.  The problem of how to govern a country of this size 
from points so distant with poor communication is not new . . .” So it was really a process of 
discovery and innovation. 
We were never able to get a high level of consensus with the hard opposition—Banzer and those 
people—or with Jaime Paz. The military believe in the central government; that’s the way they’re 
organized, that’s the way they think. The LPP (Law of Popular Participation) was an affront to the 
authoritarian way of thinking. We were looking for something that could be tolerated by the 
opposition and still be acceptable to the government. This was very important. We really went and 
discussed it with everyone, and people came back to us and we made changes. We kept working and 
finally got to a point where the opposition wasn’t so offended that they would walk out on us in the 
middle of the night. They weren’t happy, they wouldn’t support it, but they tolerated it. And it’s 
funny—the MBL voted against all the popular reforms. I don’t know why but they just voted against 
it. But some of those congressmen had been working with us on the draft law, and they voted in 
favor. So we split the parties. 
We tried to explain it as part of the popular nature of the National Revolution. We 
considered it an extension of the Revolution in areas that it had forgotten, but shouldn’t 
have. 
JPF: What was opposition to the reform like? 
GSL: The big attack on the LPP had to do with the structure of the MNR. Our party was 
organized around comandos [village or neighborhood party organizations] that were almost 
like cells. It was a revolutionary party, but also a quasi-fascist right-wing party when it 
started out. Then it evolved into a left-wing party highly influenced by the communists. We 
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had a tradition of looking after the people, and the party wanted to nurture that. So we 
worked hard to keep that kind of support. Much of the criticism came from sectors within 
the MNR, but also from other parties—from people worried that the grass-roots 
organizations [OTBs in Spanish] we were organizing to oversee municipal performance 
would turn into some system of thought control, like the commissars in the USSR. And they 
screamed and yelled about that. 
I think one of my big failures was that I didn’t make decentralization political. I tried to keep it 
depoliticized. I think I did my party a great deal of harm because rural municipalities had so little 
money to work with up to then, and this was a huge windfall. The MNR could have benefitted 
hugely from that, but I chose not to play it that way. And so I think the biggest mistake I made was 
not to make it political. I should have said, “This is our invention – we are giving you both economic 
and political power!” People saw it as a big play to consolidate power and build a powerful 
organization to serve the party. Unfortunately it wasn’t that. I didn’t want that, and I felt it was 
intellectually dishonest to sell it even to my own party as something it was not. I think I made it so 
technocratic that it lost its charisma and its sex appeal. I tried to make it apolitical, which was a big 
mistake. 
JPF: How would you have politicized the LPP to help the MNR? 
GSL: Well, we would have said, “The MNR gave you the land and the vote, and now we’re 
giving you power.” But with the transfer of funds we felt that would be a big mistake. We 
felt the LPP was of national interest, and that it would be accepted better if it wasn’t 
identified too much with the party, although the party was tickled pink. These municipalities 
had so little money because they had been deprived of the land tax, which had been the basis 
of municipal financing. They started hating departmental capitals as much as the central 
government, because everything went to them and stopped there. They were left with 
crumbs in the countryside. So I think I made a big mistake. If I’d said, “This is something 
like land reform, like the universal vote.  This is something that the party will be identified 
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with,” I think it would have been much better. I tried to show this as a national interest, and 
people attacked it anyway as a political move to win votes for the MNR. 
Actually it was a way to decentralize authority and resources, based on very simple, non-discussable 
facts. Many wanted to distribute resources according to poverty measures, but instead we tried to 
make it very concessional and create something along the lines of the Emergency Social Fund. What 
we really did was to create these municipal entities and put World Bank money in to help the poor. 
Poorer municipalities only had to put up 20 per cent of the cost of a project, but also had to have the 
approval of central government institutions. Richer municipalities had to put up 50 per cent. It meant 
they had to use transferred resources to co-finance public investments with the central government, 
because no project would work without local input. Many of these payback schedules were 
obviously subsidized. If you got a loan and you put up 20 per cent of the project cost, theoretically 
you were borrowing 80 per cent. But they got that back out of future transfers. So you almost had a 
lien on that money. 
There was also the issue of what to do with the poorest populations. We wanted to say 
everyone was equal, but of course in certain places you had to have subsidies and pump 
priming and grants. For the poorest it was grants and concessional loans, often based on 
what we were getting from international aid agencies, including the World Bank. 
2.8 Political Feasibility and Passage into Law 
JPF: How did you make this technocratic reform politically feasible? 
GSL: I tried to get my political allies to commit. I pushed the most able people who were 
political leaders and bought into this project to go out and try to sell it to the country. In the 
discussions that followed we often surprised people by making big changes to the reform. 
“This guy is a pig,” opponents cried. “All he wants is to grab resources. He doesn’t really 
care about the poor.” They were just waiting for us to run out of steam. But many more 
times than I care to remember, even when they criticized in bad faith, they turned out to be 
right. So we modified the law, and everybody thought we were negotiating. But we weren’t 
“Why I Decentralized Bolivia”  Sánchez de Lozada & Faguet 
 
 31 
negotiating—we were trying to get a serious dialogue going, trying to make it better. You 
reached a point when the opposition wasn’t that violently opposed. They hadn’t bought into 
it, but we had backed off from our more extreme positions. At that point you took it to 
Congress, and it went through like a steamroller. The way it happened was, as you went 
through the law article by article, in meetings that lasted twenty to twenty-five hours, the 
opposition would get up and go home. They didn’t want to support you, so they would leave 
and make big speeches saying “This guy is an idiot!,” “This is against the interests of my 
department!”. They would walk out and slam the door. But they didn’t leave angry because 
what they were really doing was agreeing to respect the majority. 
We could instead have rammed it through Congress with our majority. But then you lose the respect 
of the minority, and the minute you offend the minority you have some really tough guys to contend 
with. 
JPF: Did it go through Congress rapidly? 
GSL: Yes. These were very complicated laws—you couldn’t play around with them. If 
people started making changes, they were likely to end up vetoed. Under the Bolivian 
system you have ten or fifteen days to send a letter to Congress saying “I veto the stand the 
two houses made.” It’s not like the committee system in the USA. If there isn’t a two-thirds 
majority in Congress, they have to accept the changes you want. If they do have the two-
thirds, they can impose their changes, but this was rare in Bolivian politics. 
That’s why the regional thing can be very bad for you. Because people say, “This affects my 
department,” which trumps party loyalty, and they defect from your side. The big problem was 
always really the city of Santa Cruz, not the department. In our travels, rural Bolivians criticized 
departmental capitals because the capitals kept all the money they received and never sent it to the 
provinces. With Popular Participation, towns and villages realized the money would be deposited 
directly in their accounts, and that made a big difference. 
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2.9 How did you carry the MNR? 
JPF: The most important question left is: How did you carry your own party? I buy your 
story about the process of becoming President—your big victory—it’s very compelling. But 
the MNR—like any political party, and more so because it was the most successful political 
party in Bolivia—must have had a lot of self-interested politicians who, when you proposed 
to give away money and power to people in the municipalities, would have said: “No don’t 
do that, because we’re going to lose jobs, we’re going to lose influence.” 
GSL: But the MNR was a national party, so they had people who could felt they could win 
anywhere and everywhere and get jobs in the municipalities. 
JPF: I was in Bolivia at the beginning of your presidency. I remember local comandos of 
the MNR taking out full-page ads in the newspapers that said, “The comando XYZ demands 
jobs for party members!” They must have been against decentralization. After all, you could 
have simply handed down jobs and resources to lots of people in your party. Instead, now 
they were going to have to compete in municipal elections themselves. Why had they 
worked so hard to help you win? 
GSL: The party realized that this would be electorally powerful and would create jobs 
locally. When the 1964 coup
10
 brought in Barrientos and Obando, people asked Victor Paz, 
“Why has this happened?” And he said, “Because we had 300,000 party members and only 
250,000 jobs!” Basically it was a spoils system, but there weren’t enough jobs in a 
centralized, unitarian government. So the party was quite unhappy. I think one of the biggest 
failures was not to sell this as something like the universal vote or land reform—as more 
power to the people. 
JPF: I take that point. I think it’s quite right. Nonetheless, your party voted in favor in 
Congress, so it must be the case that at some level they were convinced. 
                                                 
10
 When a military coup overthrew an MNR government led by Victor Paz. 
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GSL: They were convinced. The MNR might have been a lower middle class party, but they 
were also a party that understood populism. Remember that our area of greatest power was 
always the countryside. They saw that the level of enthusiasm for Popular Participation was 
very high in the countryside. 
JPF: But it was more than just a good idea, no? I have a theory that even though you didn’t 
present it politically, the MNR thought this would capture the vote, especially of rural 
Bolivians, for them for another generation—like land reform. 
GSL: I didn’t think of that. I wanted to be all-inclusive, Unity in Diversity, this phrase that 
justified Victor Hugo Cárdenas and others joining us; that concept of a diverse society 
where people lived together, not this racist concept we have now. I felt it was best to make it 
a national policy, and I undersold it. Maybe I should have put it in the party’s hands, 
because later it went from La Ley Maldita to La Ley Bendita [from “the accursed law” to 
“the blessed law”]. And here I was saying it belongs to everybody. “It’s really not about the 
party.  We’re serving the country!” A reform like this had to be used! It was a transfer of 
power, of real power to decide, and of money to do things, and maybe we should have taken 
advantage of that. But if we politicized it, the resistance of the opposition might have been 
much greater, and we could have had a deadlock in Congress 
JPF: I remember all those people marching in the streets of La Paz calling it “La Ley 
Maldita.” What happened to that? 
GSL: When the radical left wing was told they were getting the money, and that real 
transfers had begun, their opposition evaporated. I had to overcome a lot of resistance on our 
side to make that happen. “Don’t send out checks,” demanded Miguel Urioste [a key MBL 
reformer]. But I said, “No – we’re sending them out.  Otherwise we won’t have done 
anything.  There’ll be no decentralization.” And then Carlos Hugo Molina [Secretary for 
Popular Participation] opposed changes to university funding that the reform implied. 
“Don’t touch my alma mater!” The thing is, change is very hard. Everyone is afraid of it. 
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All the people from Banzer’s party, who were very close to this concept of devolution, and Jaime 
Paz’s party—they were the children of privilege. They wanted what they called decentralization, not 
giving power away to people. So they continued to oppose it, but more quietly after a while. 
A lot of the positions around Popular Participation were of a political nature. Some of the 
people who resisted popular participation were the unions! Why? Because if you had to 
report to a community, you lost your power to negotiate. You went from speaking for them 
to answering to them. If you gave the community the power to hire and fire, you would 
break the back of the inamovilidad—the tenure system—in education, where promotion 
depends on years of service and not performance. Instead, you would have a community to 
respond to. When I travelled around, I realized that rural teachers who claimed, “We 
sacrifice ourselves for the country,” actually lived in the cities. They spent three days a week 
in the community and imposed very long school days on poor students, so they could 
squeeze six days of lessons into three. 
Lots of people talk about decentralization, but no one actually wants to do it. In the 1899 
Civil War, La Paz flew the flag of federalism, promising to make Bolivia a federal country, 
against Sucre and the unitary state. They mobilized indigenous forces to fight alongside 
them, promising them land and better lives. But when they won and gained control of the 
government, they suddenly changed their minds. They found themselves happy to preside 
over a unitary state, and went back to repressing indigenous people. That’s the dynamic—
people never want to give up power. 
JPF: Let’s talk more about the Bolivian decentralization debate before 1994. What was it 
like? Who was pushing for decentralization and who was pushing against? 
GSL: Well, there was and there wasn’t such a debate. What they called decentralization was 
devolution to regional governments—to elected prefects (as governors) representing the 
departments, whose income derived from royalties on extractive industries: gas, petroleum, 
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mining, forestry, etc. What they were really talking about was a federal system, which is not 
the same. 
The regions and the capitals, mainly Santa Cruz and Tarija, were in favor. It was those two 
departments because they had petroleum. They wanted to control the income they produced. They 
wanted their own elected departmental congresses and prefects. 
JPF: But who were “they”? Basically business leaders and landowners? 
GSL: First of all, it was an elite—business groups and different social movements and civic 
organizations that were created for that end. 
JPF: Why did the push for that kind of regional decentralization—what the cruceños and 
tarijeños wanted—never succeed before the LPP? 
GSL: Because the parties didn’t want it. We had internal problems because both the parties 
and government coalitions of the time were torn between their political and regional 
loyalties. Which pressures to obey? The pressure could become fierce. I was Minister of 
Planning and Co-ordination for the famous stabilization law, 21060. We cut a lot of things, 
and I was declared persona non grata in all the departments of Bolivia except one, which I 
was wise enough not to visit. In Cochabamba, my own district, I was declared persona non-
grata twice. 
JPF: Why specifically did the parties resist? 
GSL: Because of conflict with the regions, which fought fiercely for their interests. It was a 
continual fight about resources. They wanted control of more and more of the national 
budget, not just royalties from their oil and gas. We were being pressured terribly by the 
teachers’ unions, universities, and regional organizations. The parties were all suffering. 
Many felt it was expedient to be more loyal to regional groups and interest groups like 
teacher and health-worker unions from those areas. They demanded more and more without 
ever looking at where the money came from. Party discipline was a big problem because 
politicians feared the regions. 
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But the private sector was in agreement because they were scared of populist movements like 
Condepa and the UCS. Highland regions were also scared of so-called “decentralization” to regional 
governments, who would have had large incomes from raw materials. Regional elites were very well 
organized and vocal, and regularly made unreasonable budgetary demands. So really what I was 
doing was co-opting people by going down to a much more popular level. 
JPF: That’s interesting. So you put together a coalition of highland interests, private sector 
interests, and others who could see that this was going to solve a number of problems? 
GSL: Yes. I didn’t know exactly how those problems would be solved, but I had something 
that was very important: high credibility from having been with Victor Paz Estenssoro, and 
stopping hyperinflation, and also being able to communicate well. 
JPF: I remember this period vividly. The MNR had been out of power and it was obviously 
a painful experience for them. No party likes being out of power, and the MNR—who made 
the National Revolution—always felt that it was the natural party of government. 
GSL: They also had good political instincts. They weren’t ideologically blocked. They 
weren’t like the communists, or the fascists, blocked into a rigid way of thinking. 
JPF: How did you convince the MNR to support Popular Participation? 
GSL: Because it appealed to the MNR by its very name and substance—giving power back 
to the people. Also, as a national party the MNR was built of local and regional comandos. 
That’s why we were so good in elections, because we had a political structure all over the 
country at all levels. We had the comandos departamentales, comandos provinciales, 
comandos municipales . . . and we had people who could see that this was a transfer of 
power and money. They had a good intuition and could see the political benefit. 
But I tried to make it something very intellectual and that was a big mistake. “No lo politizaremos 
[Let’s not exploit this politically],” I insisted. Instead perhaps I should have made speeches saying, 
“We gave you the land, we gave you the vote, and now we’re going to give you power so you can 
participate in local decisions about the things that really affect your daily life.” We were attacked for 
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politicizing it anyway—La Ley Maldita, and everyone who said “These guys are going to use it 
politically.” But they didn’t realize it was going to be a true restructuring of political power and 
development. 
But the MNR understood it immediately. They supported it, they applauded it, and they won 
local elections. They were very happy because instead of fighting for jobs they could win 
the local election. They went and sold it to the people, “We’re going to have this and that,” 
and the MNR just took over local power. We had landslides in the first municipal elections. 
We wiped everybody out because we had party members in all the regions, and we were a 
party that identified with the countryside. I had broken the glass ceiling of being able to win 
the cities for the MNR. I can’t tell you the results we had in those first months. 
2.10 Popular Participation in Action 
JPF: So now the law’s been promulgated. What happens next? 
GSL: Before, no one ran for local government because the municipalities had no money. A 
few women ran and won. When popular participation came, and money with it, the men 
were indignant. They began throwing the women out of office. They’d say, “In the next 
election we’ve got to get rid of all these women, who only became candidates because there 
was no money.” 
So lots more men came in. But many women remained—many more than in national government. 
And I really learned. I really listened and I saw the wisdom of it. I saw, of course, that local 
government is women’s government—and they’re fifty per cent of the population and the mother of 
the other fifty per cent. So I think it’s all about the power of women. 
JPF: So this is unlocking women’s power in some sense? 
GSL: I belonged to a society where my mother was the one who taught us how to swim. My 
father was very affectionate. He was a great intellect and a very wise man, but my mother 
had the balls. 
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JPF: Then what happened? 
GSL: Then the people had to decide what to do. So the first thing they do is fix the plaza, 
and then they fix the football field. “These idiots, they should be spending on education,” 
said the critics. But these were the things that meant a lot to people. It was their right, their 
local identity. Of course, they later got around to education and health, which were vital. 
And what popular participation did was public investment. Before, the World Bank and 
other donors financed many wonderful hospitals and filled them full of equipment. But 
nobody had money for maintenance. The central government paid salaries, but the hospital 
had no band aids, they had no alcohol, they had nothing to operate with. 
With participation, local people had the money to make sure these things actually ran. As they put up 
the money, they made sure the work got done and the money wasn’t stolen. That’s when it went 
from Ley Maldita to Ley Bendita—it was very sudden. And that’s when everybody who was in 
politics started hating us. “These people gave everybody the vote together with land reform,” they 
said, “and we won’t be able to get rid of them for generations.  Now they are going to stay forever!” 
We tried to reintroduce land taxes, but we weren’t successful. We did reintroduce land taxes 
on large plots of land, though. 
JPF: When were land taxes abolished? In the Revolution? 
GSL: When they gave out the land they abolished the tax. Which was idiotic because it was 
a firm principle of ownership since colonial times—if you pay a tax on it, it belongs to you. 
That created a big problem because with urbanization people who wanted to build couldn’t 
get title to the land. “How are we going to know who owns it?” they kept saying. It’s very 
simple, you just walk along and if a dog starts barking at you, that’s the beginning of 
someone’s property. Dogs know where the property is. You can’t do it with aerial 
photography or GPS. But you can with a dog—a dog is trained to know what belongs to his 
master. 
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The World Bank wanted very sophisticated answers on how we were going to implement these 
measures. And of course all this “give all the power to the Soviets” stuff, they didn’t like that very 
much. Nobody likes it because what everyone wants is to control other people. But Popular 
Participation worked because if communities didn’t put money in, they didn’t get money out. This 
was based on the Emergency Social Fund, which was Victor Paz’ great idea. I was a technocrat; I 
wanted to talk about inflation. He said, “Goni, you can’t do it if you don't take care of the people. 
You've got to create jobs.” He was a good politician. 
JPF: Looking back on it now, do you think that the Law of Popular Participation did what 
you set out to achieve? 
GSL: I think it did in part. It was attacked violently from the left and the right. But it 
worked. I’m always very proud of the fact that when I went into government, 75 per cent of 
public investment was managed from La Paz and 25 per cent in the regions, and when I left 
government 25 per cent was managed from La Paz and 75 per cent in the regions. It 
increased funding for education and health all over the country. It was a fabulous reform. 
JPF: Were there any outcomes from decentralization that you didn’t expect? 
GSL: I didn’t expect a high level of corruption. 
JPF: You didn’t? Really? 
GSL: No, I felt people would run things well. When the Catholic Church said corruption 
would increase, I always had a very good reply. I’d say, “At least we’ll have achieved a true 
democracy in corruption. Usually only the guys on top steal, and that’s not fair.  Now 
everybody steals!” But the church was right—they had a more realistic view. 
But, you know, as time went by people started to pay the price for corruption. My grandmother used 
to say, “There are two things you can’t hide.  One is money and the other is love.” And money in a 
small community is hard to hide. You can’t put it in Switzerland. People would look and say, 
“Where the hell did that truck come from?” 
2.11 Goni’s Political Legacy 
“Why I Decentralized Bolivia”  Sánchez de Lozada & Faguet 
 
 40 
JPF: Let’s move on to the end of your presidency. 
GSL: I left government in 1997 because I had to comply with the Constitution. But many 
people said that I had a constitutional method of staying in power for another term. A clause 
in the constitutional reform increasing the presidential term from four to five years would 
have permitted re-election once, with a two-thirds vote in Congress. But I knew I had a 
conflict of interest so I didn’t take the re-election, and I’ll tell you why. To get the two-
thirds vote I needed to do a deal with either Banzer or Jaime Paz. Jaime Paz approached me 
and said, “The Americans are persecuting me because they say I used drug money for my 
campaigns.” They’d taken away his visa and were pressuring me to apply the anti-drug law 
to throw him in jail. So Jaime Paz said to me, “I’m willing to vote for your re-election.” 
“And benefit from a deal with the accused?” I said. “You don’t have to do a deal with me. I 
won’t persecute you. I’ve told the Americans that if they have proof of what they’re 
alleging, they should apply for your extradition instead of taking away your visa and 
degrading your reputation.” I promised unconditionally not to do it, even without his 
support. 
The cynical American ambassador said to me, “You know, the proof we have wouldn’t be permitted 
in a US court.” They wanted me to do their dirty work for them. So I didn’t take that deal, and 
everybody’s criticized me because I didn’t have enough time to see my reforms through. Maybe I 
did the right thing, maybe I didn’t. But that’s the way I did it. 
JPF: You could have traded for it? 
GSL: Yes, because he came in thinking that I was a good politician, which obviously I 
wasn’t. 
In fact, it was the wrong thing. When I was out of government, Banzer and Jaime Paz worked very 
hard over five years destroying everything we did. The biggest mistake I made was not making that 
deal with Jaime Paz to get another term. Because with his party we had the two-thirds I needed to 
run again. My party didn’t help me either because they didn’t want me to stay. Everybody wants to 
replace you. I felt bad about it on ethical grounds, but it was a terrible mistake. I could easily have 
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won an even bigger re-election. They would have asked, “Why do you need five more years?” and I 
would have answered, “Trees need time to produce fruit. It took a year and a half to put these 
reforms in place, now let me finish.” And the people would have said, “Let him finish. Let’s see if it 
works.” With five more years we would have seen the reforms bear fruit, and then Banzer and Jaime 
Paz wouldn’t have been able to cut those trees down. 
Indeed, that’s why we moved to a five-year term. I learned that traveling around the 
countryside. Reform is like a fruit tree—you have to wait years to get the fruit. In the third 
year you start getting some fruit, and then more in the fourth year, and in the fifth year you 
finally see full production. So if you reform, a fifth year gives you a chance of seeing results 
before your party goes through another election. 
All of these reforms could be dismantled. I felt the changes we’d made were so fundamental 
they couldn’t be reversed. But they were. 
JPF: Where do you fit in Bolivia’s political history? Where is your place? 
GSL: When I was elected, there were primaries and Guillermo Bedregal (the party’s no. 2) 
won most of them. But then the party chose me, because the people in the party knew they 
couldn’t win an election with him but they could with me. First, because I was more 
credible, and second—I had money! So they and the technocrats said, “This is the man who 
can do it.” 
But politicians are so self-centered. Although Victor Paz helped me, he was really upset because he 
wanted to finish his career with all of us, like Hindu wives, burnt on the pyre of his retirement. He 
was very upset with me when I became the candidate, although he did help me to obtain the 
nomination. He was upset because he was worried about his future. He was going into history and he 
had had some bad scrapes, but was able to return to power each time. His was the best government—
his first and last governments—the last was a great government. I gave a speech and said that a 
politician is a man who looks at the next election, and a statesman is a man who looks at the next 
generation. So when I went to visit Victor Paz to present my resignation [as Minister], he said to me, 
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“Goni, I’ve seen a lot of people over my career, and among the few that I think could be statesmen is 
you.  But please explain to me, how the hell are you going to win this coming election?!?” 
JPF: You think he was worried about being overshadowed by you? 
GSL: No. I think, first of all, he couldn’t leave it to a guy with a mining background; second, 
to a guy who had taken all the brunt of stabilization and all that brutal criticism; and third, to 
a guy who had this accent so far removed from peoples’ lives. This was my first election, 
which I won and they stole from me. He couldn’t believe that I had any chance. He 
preferred me to leave the scene, and for him to outlive his party. He wanted the party buried 
because he had founded it; he made the big revolution, and then the big counter-
revolution—in this way Victor Paz is what Mao always dreamed of being. But Mao didn’t 
have the experience, and he didn’t have the people who would listen to him like Victor Paz 
did, by following him out and then following him back again. He had this wonderful 
reputation and he really deserved it. 
I wish I hadn’t been so intellectually arrogant. But you know you have to be an egomaniac to be a 
politician. The cost–benefit is so bad that you can’t think you’re human. My wife and my daughter—
real people—were never in agreement that I should stay in politics because they had lived the ups 
and downs of political service. My wife’s grandfather—a very good judge who happened to be the 
president of an interim government that called elections after the revolution that brought down the 
ancien regime—he was exiled by the MNR. The MNR got into power and of course threw him out. 
My wife and daughter saw how he suffered, an honest man and all the rest. So nobody wanted me to 
be in it. But I obviously had it in my genes. When democracy came to Bolivia, my father said, “Goni 
I don’t think you really want to be the richest man in South America’s poorest country. Now you 
have to go into public service.” So of course I went to help the MNR and ended up in Parliament. 
That’s a long story. A lot of it was luck, and a lot of it was instinct and something that I wanted. 
JPF: Did you think that your first presidency would be a second revolution? And that you 
would be a second historic figure for Bolivia? 
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GSL: Yes. Whitehead said, “Progress is change with order and order with change.” We were 
making a revolution in democracy. What is the definition of a revolution? It’s irreversible 
change. But that’s where I made a dramatic mistake. I didn’t realize that in four years, the 
time it took me to get these concepts clarified and go through the dialectic, not only would it 
take so long to prepare, but once we presented the law we needed to go through hours and 
hours of meetings at community level with the unions and with parties, and we would even 
hold a great deal of meetings at town halls. People would come and Victor Hugo Cardenas 
[Bolivia’s first indigenous Vice President, from 1993to 1997] and I would answer questions 
about popular participation. All these interest groups, like the teachers, and all the party 
members were against this, saying, “How can you give power to ignorant people?  How can 
they vote if they don’t know how to read or write?  How can they run their own affairs if 
they’re illiterate?” And I said, “The majority of Bolivians are illiterate, but they all know 
how to count. Go down to the market and see if you can get a good deal out of these cholas.  
They know better than anybody what to do!” 
JPF: In 1997 you handed over the Presidential sash to Gen. Hugo Banzer. But you chose to 
stay in politics. Why? 
GSL: I always said the best job I ever had was in Congress. I loved being part of Congress. I 
liked negotiating in the halls, and all the horse trading. I always said, any job where you go 
to committee meetings after 10 a.m., and you don’t have to go to work until after 3 p.m., is a 
good job. And every idiotic thing you say is recorded for posterity. 
There are three things that people struggle for in politics. First money, but I already had that. I don’t 
think honesty is a virtue, I think honesty is a habit. My family has had generations of people who 
didn’t steal. Secondly you want women, and I’d had enough of that. I would have loved to be like 
Gaddafi and Berlusconi, but I’m too timid. I’m dominated by my wife! And thirdly, you do it for 
social position, and I had social position. That was my weakness—I had confidence, I was educated. 
So when you have those things, why are you in politics? You have a mix of, let’s say, a desire for 
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public service and you want to effect change. You want that change to be irreversible, but it’s not. Or 
at least it wasn’t. 
Public service, wanting to serve your country—I think it’s the ultimate arrogance. It’s Greek 
hubris to think you can leave a mark in history. You can’t. I think you plant a seed and 
maybe a tree grows, but you can’t guarantee what it grows into. I wasn’t able to—probably 
due to factors beyond my control. I think part of it is that you can’t be a politician if you’re 
not willing to bend with the wind. If you think you can be perfectly ethical and be in 
politics, you don’t understand what you’re doing! It’s like thinking you can ride a horse 
without a bridle. So I think it was just absolute hubris. I felt I could do it and have all these 
things without dirtying my name. And now, of course, I’m accused of genocide. 
2.12 Changes in Bolivian Politics Since 1994 
JPF: It’s self-evident that Bolivian politics have changed a lot in the last decade. Around the 
time when you were winning elections in the 1990s and early 2000s, we had a stable 
equilibrium of political parties that varied in terms of composition and ideology. But there 
was broadly a left–right spectrum, pro-labor vs. pro-business, with the MNR roughly in the 
middle, straddling that divide. How have Bolivian politics changed since then? 
GSL: Of the so-called “traditional parties,” the MNR had the strongest position because the 
changes it made were long-lasting. Land reform gave the MNR great strength in the 
countryside. Village elders told the young how life had been before land reform, and the 
peasantry voted for the MNR again and again. But over time people migrated to the city, 
farming and land became less important, and the elders started dying out. And the 
countryside began to lose that memory, and that gratitude. 
Also, the ADN and the MIR worked very hard to discredit what we achieved. I gave Banzer five 
years in power,
11 but he didn’t know what to do with it. All he wanted was to return to the 
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 Goni’s reform of the executive branch lengthened the presidential term from four to five years. 
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Presidential Palace via the ballot box. He didn’t actually have a platform—no idea what to do with 
the power he’d finally won legitimately. So he set about destroying many of the things I’d done, like 
the Bonosol. [The Bonosol paid elderly Bolivians a pension that raised many above the poverty line, 
out of the dividends from the capitalization of the big state-owned enterprises.] It was a beautiful 
idea. But they destroyed it. 
JPF: Why do you think they did this? 
GSL: Because they were worried that with these reforms the MNR would be in power 
forever. They had to undercut the basis of our popularity. 
Since then everything has changed. Evo Morales came in and sold the idea of lucha de razas [racial 
warfare] to Bolivians. 
Another big change has to do with drugs. I underestimated the problem of drugs. Since the 
1950s, with land reform, coca was a symbol of colonial humiliation. People looked down on 
it. But the US decision to make it illegal had terrible effects on Bolivia. Prices and 
profitability shot up, and people started producing it like crazy. But we don’t even capture 
much of the profit. Only 15 per cent of the street value of cocaine stays in Bolivia. The other 
85 per cent goes to foreign traffickers. 
Some of this drug money started flowing into politics. That’s what the Jaime Paz deal was 
all about. Bolivian politics was already very corrupt—corruption was tied up with coalitions 
and agreements between parties over legislation and policy. People ran for office because of 
the corruption opportunities available to the winners. It was always going to be hard to 
eradicate. But then the drug money came in and turbo-charged the whole thing. 
JPF: How were parties structured internally prior to 1994? Were they elitist? Verticalist? Or 
horizontal with strong grass-roots support? 
GSL: The ADN were people who benefitted from Banzer’s dictatorship. The MIR were a 
bunch of leftists who sold out for money. Both parties were vehicles for their respective 
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leaders, Hugo Banzer and Jaime Paz, with everyone else basically riding their coat-tails. 
Neither survived the demise of the leader. 
All the parties were run from the top down. All of them had lost touch with their grass-roots 
supporters. This was a worse problem for the ADN and MIR, which lacked the strong structure of 
the MNR’s local and regional comandos. And that was made worse when Banzer’s government 
began destroying my more popular reforms. People could see through that; it wasn’t smart. 
JPF: Did decentralization contribute to the downfall of the traditional parties? 
GSL: The parties were already in trouble, and then, with Popular Participation, you could no 
longer use the political hacks you had before—they would lose local elections. You had to 
find people who were popular locally. We did this, but it was hard. The MNR had a 
structure that should have made it easier, but we weren’t used to operating that way. And the 
other parties had worse traditions and no structure, so they were totally out of touch. 
In the MNR, we just couldn’t get used to it. The problem of women in politics is one example. 
Before the reform, local government was powerless and moneyless, and women dominated it. After 
reform, the men realized what was going on and went and kicked all the women out of their local 
offices. A lot of those were MNR men kicking out the women. It didn’t help us win elections. 
More broadly, the system of the second round in Congress [which traditionally decided most 
Bolivian elections] began to break down, because the way you held coalitions together was 
through patronage and corruption. With Popular Participation, patronage and corruption 
spread throughout the country. At the national level it got harder and more expensive to hold 
governments together. That was part of the political collapse. That is the story of my second 
term. 
Afterword: Bolivia’s Recent Political History [JPF] 
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The changes alluded to above undermined the Bolivian political party system, although happily not 
its democracy.
12
 Following on from decentralization by about a decade, a political tidal wave swept 
Goni from power and drowned all of the traditional political parties, and with them the political 
party system that had run the country for fifty years. 
Since the 1952 Revolution, Bolivian politics had been centered on the MNR, accompanied by 
various opponents and offshoots to both left and right that alternated in power in a broadly stable, 
left–right, pro-labor vs. pro-business equilibrium that survived numerous coups and dramatic 
economic shocks. In 2003, political protests against Goni’s second MNR-led government morphed 
into a popular uprising that led to his resignation and exile in the USA. With fewer congressmen 
than before, Goni depended on a larger number of more diverse parties for his congressional 
majority. As his position weakened in 2002–3, he drew more parties into the alliance. When 
civilians were killed by security forces and protest turned into full-scale revolt, not only the 
President was implicated, but most of the political system. When Goni fell, all of the traditional 
parties fell with him. 
The old regime collapsed, leaving a yawning political vacuum. Into this stepped Evo Morales 
and his Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). Bolivia’s new politics is amorphous and still developing; 
its key competitive dimension since around 2005 has been ethnic and regional identity, although 
there is no guarantee that this will persist. The MAS itself is a comparatively loose political 
movement, much less organized or institutionalized than the MNR was before, its appeal largely 
centered on Morales himself. How it is likely to develop within a new Bolivian politics is 
impossible to say. But we can already conclude that the rise of the MAS was predicated on 
decentralization, which was crucial to the political transformation that swept the country. 
To see this, consider these stylized facts. Until the 1990s, Congress was dominated by Bolivia’s 
landed, business, and professional elite. More than 90 per cent of its members were educated upper-
middle- and upper-class people with European surnames, private educations, and residences in its 
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 As of this writing. 
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largest cities’ best neighborhoods. They were typically men who developed careers in the private 
sector before penetrating national politics horizontally, via a party. Today, over half of Bolivia’s 
Congress, and over four-fifths of its Constitutional Convention, comes from small towns and 
villages. They tend to be browner than their forebears, with indigenous surnames like Quispe, 
Callisaya, or Mamani, fewer diplomas, and backgrounds as carpenters, truck drivers, and farmers 
(as distinct from landowners). As Zuazo (2009) notes, they overwhelmingly got their political start 
in local government, as mayors, GRO leaders, and municipal councillors. Decentralization served as 
both platform and training ground, allowing them to ascend to higher levels of politics through 
successive elections. In simple terms, it provided a ladder up for budding politicians in Bolivia’s 
villages and poor neighborhoods where previously none existed. Although they joined established 
parties for the first few elections, they soon turned their backs on such parties and overthrew them 
in favor of their own amorphous movement. 
If the future of this new politics is hard to predict, the future of decentralization is not. Bolivia’s 
current rulers were formed in the crucible of local politics. They see it as both natural and “theirs.” 
They want more of it, as do voters. Hence one of Morales’ major reforms has been a dramatic 
deepening of decentralization via the 2009 Constitution and the 2010 Law of Autonomies and 
Decentralization (Faguet 2013). Major innovations include the introduction of indigenous and rural 
autonomous governments for “nations and peoples who share a cultural identity, language, 
historical traditions, institutions, territory, and world view” (Government of Bolivia, 2010, Art. 
30(1)). The law allows such communities to govern themselves and organize their economies 
according to their own principles, practices, and forms of organization. Within such areas, 
traditional institutions and practices supersede the legal forms of the state (e.g. elected mayors and 
municipal councils). These are key elements in the construction of what the MAS calls the new, 
diverse, “pluri-national” Bolivia. 
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This leaves us with a final, potent irony: Morales, the MAS, and the “new Bolivia” want badly 
to stand for the deliberate, systematic rejection of a “neoliberal” past—the most potent symbol of 
which is Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada.  But all are, in the deepest sense, his own creation. 
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